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Abstract
An influential conventional wisdom holds that oil causes intrastate conflict and that
oil in particular explains the prevalence of domestic political violence in the Muslim world.
I show that the relationship between oil and intrastate conflict in the empirical literature is
more ambiguous than commonly assumed. I test to see if the various measures of the oil
resource predict any dimension of intrastate conflict in the Muslim world. My results show
oil resources are associated with lower levels of civil conflict, repression and terrorism in
Muslim-majority countries. This supports the ‘rentier state’ perspective which states that
regimes with significant oil resources mitigate conflict by strengthening the state relative
to the populace and by distributing rent. Lastly, I argue the reasons for the concentration
of conflict in Muslim world are not understood but the fact that Muslim ‘rentier states’ are
able to effectively mitigate conflict offers some clues.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Empirically global intrastate conflict rose during the Cold War but has since
significantly declined. According to the Human Security Report (2013), there was an
average number of two civil wars per year in the seventies and three civil wars in the
eighties but this dropped to an average of 1.2 in the nineties and 0.8 in the first decade of
the twenty-first century. The report also noted that interstate conflict largely vanished after
the seventies. This trend is reflected in the total number of combat fatalities: there were
close to an average of 50 battle-deaths per million people in the seventies and eighties but
the rate dropped to half of that in the nineties and lower to about 5 battle-deaths in the first
decade of the twenty-first century. This trend reflects a broader scholarly consensus about
the decline of human conflict, most famously argued by Pinker (2011) as well as
(Goldstein, 2011). There is unfortunately an exception to this trend – Muslim-majority
states.
Great swaths of the Muslim world are embroiled in civil war, repression and
terrorism. Muslim-majority countries are about a quarter of the world’s states but are
experiencing nine out of ten of its most violent civil wars (The Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict, 2015). Nine of the twenty-one most repressive states are Muslimmajority, five of the others experience insurgency and/or terrorism from Muslim minorities
(Cingranelli, 2014). Moreover, seven out the ten countries experiencing the most terrorism
are Muslim-majority; two of the others involve significant Muslim minorities (Institute for
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Economics and Peace, 2015). Intrastate conflict is by far the dominant form of conflict
today and most of it is in the Muslim World.
A prominent explanation for this trend is the relative abundance of hydrocarbon
deposits in the Muslim World. In a BBC article titled ‘Oil and conflict – a natural mix’,
Reynolds (2004) claims ‘oil and what it represents – energy – have always been a source
of conflict’. Writing for Foreign Affairs, Ross (2011) asserts that ‘divine intervention did
not cause repression in the Middle East: hydrocarbons did.’ An article in The Atlantic by
Patrick (2012) argues that ‘the very presence of oil and gas resources within developing
countries exacerbates the risk of violent conflict’. More recently, Wenar (2016) also
writing for Foreign Affairs claims ‘oil states in the developing world are more than 200
percent more likely to suffer civil wars’ and that ‘the repression, conflict and extreme
ideologies that bedevil petrostates have made the entire world less secure’.
The prevalent argument is supported by a number of academic studies. These
studies claim oil encourages civil war through several mechanisms: by motivating rebels
to fight for control of the lucrative resource, by enabling rebels to fund their campaigns, by
weakening the state’s administrative capacity, and by fostering authoritarianism and
corruption which provokes rebellion (see Noland & Hendrix, 2014: pp. 42-44). Moreover,
it is claimed that oil enables state repression (DeMeritt and Young, 2013) which
purportedly instigates terrorism (Conrad and Milton, 2013). Muslim-majority states
generally export significantly more oil than other states; their average income from oil
exports as a percentage of GDP is more than five times the mean of non-Muslim majority
countries (Conrad and Milton, 2013: p. 324; Karakaya, 2015: p. 521). Consequently, there
are grounds to argue that the presence of oil explains the high levels of civil conflict,
2

repression and terrorism in Muslim-majority countries (see respectively: Karakaya, 2015:
p. 511; DeMeritt and Young, 2013: p. 111; Conrad and Milton, 2013: p. 331).
This paper examines that argument by testing if the presence of oil predicts the
prevalence of civil war, repression and terrorism in Muslim-majority countries. It draws
nuances from the academic literature – particularly pertaining to oil and violence measures
– and applies them to a specific question: what explains intrastate conflict in the Muslim
world? This study does not attempt to find the best explanatory variables, but it robustly
evaluates one of the most prominent explanations, and uses it to draw insights into violence
in Muslim-majority states. The paper proceeds in five sections. The first section discusses
the literature on intrastate conflict, the relationship between oil wealth and intrastate
conflict, and between Islam and intrastate conflict. The second explains the data. The third
conducts the tests. The fourth discusses places the findings in academic discourse and the
concluding section discusses their implications for the real-world.
The findings demonstrate that the presence of oil is not associated with any of the
dimensions of intrastate conflict in the Muslim world. In fact, the opposite is true – oil
measures are correlated with lower levels of civil war, repression and terrorism. These
results decisively support the ‘rentier state’ model of the oil-conflict link which holds that
states with oil wealth effectively minimize internal opposition and conflict by
strengthening state institutions and distributing rents. These results contradict several
studies that claim oil is a source of intrastate conflict in Muslim-majority countries (notably
Karakaya, 2015; DeMeritt and Young, 2013; Conrad and Milton, 2013), instead they show
that it is a source of relative stability. This indicates that the Muslim world has high levels
of intrastate conflict not because but despite its oil wealth. Finally, given that Muslim3

majority countries produce roughly 40 percent of the world’s oil, these results also
undermine claims for a positive link between oil and intrastate conflict in general.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
The positive trend regarding intrastate conflict identified in the Human Security
Report (2013) is empirically valid yet conflicts with our intuitive perception of the issue.
How can intrastate conflict be on the decline when the media and press are brimming with
news of governments engaging in violent repression against their civilians and civilians
engaging in acts of terrorism against other civilians and their government? This is partly a
product of modern technology amplifying the way conflict is perceived and felt far beyond
where it is happening. But it also has to do with the way the Human Security Report (2013)
and many scholars of intrastate violence measure their subject of study. They generally use
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data which measures civil conflict and war in
terms of battle-deaths. The Correlates of War (CoW) project is second only to UCDP in
terms of prominence and utilizes a similar definition for civil war. 1 On the other hand,
much of the violence evident on our TVs and newspapers is either state repression or nonstate terrorism – both of which target civilians. The casualties caused by these are not
classified as combat- or battle-related deaths.
These types of political violence are measured but are usually not categorized as
intrastate conflict. There is notable empirical literature on state repression which employs
definitions ranging from violation of the freedom of speech to the mass killing of civilians.

See Sambanis (2004) for a discussion of the ‘conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational
definition’ for civil war.
1
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This subfield has been fairly disjointed with researchers myopically exploring their
particular type of repression until relatively recently (see Davenport and Inman [2012]).
While there is still no universally agreed upon definition of repression, scholars focusing
on political violence have operationalized repression as state violence against civilians.
There is a more established subfield devoted to the empirical study of terrorism but it also
grapples with definitions, not least because the definition of terrorism is politically
sensitive. Nonetheless, most scholars of terrorism define terrorism as violence inflicted on
civilians by non-state actors for political purposes (for a discussion of the issue see Young
and Findley [2011]). Interestingly, an aggregation of these definitions of civil war,
repression and terrorism account for all types of intrastate political violence. No study to
my knowledge has incorporated these variables into one test, but it appears to be an
effective way to achieve a holistic understanding of violent intrastate conflict. This chapter
reviews literature on repression and terrorism in addition to civil war as part of its analysis
of intrastate conflict.
Islam and intrastate conflict
Global interstate conflict has almost vanished and intrastate conflict is in decline.
But as noted Muslim-majority countries are a major exception. Gleditsch and Rudolfsen
(2015) make a few observations about conflict in the Muslim world using UCDP civil war
data. First, 71 percent of Muslim-majority countries as opposed to 51 Christian-majority
countries have experienced civil war since WWII. Also, in terms of conflict duration, 20
percent of Muslim-majority country-years as opposed to 10 percent of Christian-majority
country-years have experienced civil war in this period. However, Christian-majority
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countries have historically dominated the global trend because they are more numerous. 2
Second, since the Cold War-era spike in civil wars stemming from a number of newly
independent countries, from which Muslim-majority states were relatively immune, there
has been a general decline – but the trend among Muslim-majority countries has been
rising. Today, almost all civil wars are taking place in Muslim-majority countries. Third,
there have been many Muslim insurgent groups operating in predominately non-Muslim
countries but relatively few non-Muslim insurgent groups operating in Muslim-majority
states. Lastly, civil wars in Muslim-majority and other states are increasingly characterized
by Islamist insurgencies. Figures I – III provide an overview of these data. Gleditsch and
Rudolfsen (2015) admit that researchers do not have a good understanding of these trends.
One of the most prominent explanations for the concentration of conflict in the
Muslim world is its common religion. The fact that religion can facilitate violence is well
established. We know that religious actors initiate conflict at higher rates compared to
others (Fox and Sandler, 2004), when they do the conflicts last longer (Horowitz, 2009),
are significantly more deadly (Pearce, 2005), and are less likely to end in a negotiated
settlement (Svensson, 2007). We know in particular that the intensity and exclusivity of
religious practice in groups predicts conflict intensity and duration (Day, 2015).
Juergensmeyer (2003) claims these movements feature a ‘moral absolutism’ that enables
‘cultures of violence’.3 These findings are complimented by studies that apply economic

2

It should be noted that 100 percent of Judaist-majority and 67 percent of Hindu-majority countries have
experienced civil war. But given that there is one only Judaist-majority country and two Hindu-majority
countries, these religions do not significantly impact global conflict trends. These states are also not
numerous or geographically distributed enough to make broader inferences but represent an interesting
trend.
3

Atran (2003) explains that ‘such sentiments characterize institutional manipulation of emotionally driven
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models to religious organizations (Iannaccone, 1992; Berman, 2009). They find religious
organizations use their communitarian nature to cultivate a high amount of social capital
among their members which allows them to field effective insurgent and terrorist
organizations that are resilient to free-riding and defections. However, these studies
emphasize that all religions have this potential which does not explain the concentration of
intrastate conflict in the Muslim world or the fact that about 90 percent of battle deaths
since 2010 were in conflicts with least one party representing political Islam (see Gleditsch
and Rudolfsen, 2015; Gates et al., 2016).

(Figure I: All civil wars, civil wars in Muslim-majority countries and civil wars
with Islamist insurgencies 1946-2013. Source: Gleditsch and Rudolfsen, 2015)

commitments that may have emerged under natural selection’s influence to refine or override short-term
rational calculations that would otherwise preclude achieving goals against long odds’ (p. 1537).
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(Figure II: Civil wars in Muslim-majority countries and civil wars where the
insurgents are Islamist, as share of all civil wars, 1946-2013. Source: Gleditsch and
Rudolfsen, 2015)

(Figure III: Share of battle deaths in civil wars occurring in Muslim countries. The
figure shows two partly overlapping time series of battle deaths data: from PRIO [1946–
2008] and UCDP [1989–2013]. Source: Gleditsch and Rudolfsen, 2015)
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A number of intellectuals have argued that among religions Islam is uniquely
violent. In Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu (1995) claims that ‘the gentleness so
recommended in the gospel stands opposed to the despotic fury with which a prince would
mete out his own justice and exercise his cruelties…The Mohammedan religion which
speaks only with a sword, continues to act on men with the destructive spirit that founded
it’ (pp. 461-462). More recently, Ben-Dor and Pedahzur (2003) contend that Islam is
particularly prone to religious violence given the tradition’s emphasis on jihad and
martyrdom, its activist and revolutionary nature, and its totalistic prescriptions for society.
Lewis (2004) points out that Islamic theology views the world split between the abode of
belief and (tellingly) abode of war. A notable amount of scholarship supports either parts
or all of these ‘essentialist’ claims about Islam (see Deeb, 1992; Layachi and Haireche,
1992; Piscatori, 1994; Mazrui, 1997; Denoeux, 2002; Payne, 2003; Pipes, 2003).
Huntington (1996) famously argues in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order that recent conflicts largely stem from the rise of Islamic consciousness and
as a result ‘Islam’s borders are bloody and so are its innards’ (p. 258).
An increasing number of studies oppose these arguments. These scholars tend to
blame the Western media and ‘essentialist’ scholars of popularizing what they see as an
undue relationship between Islam and violence (see Said, 1997; Roy, 2004; Jackson, 2007;
Ahmad, 2011). Instead they advance ‘instrumentalist’ explanations for the apparent
association. They see Islam as a language and vehicle for the expression and enactment of
grievance- and greed-based motivations. Coward and Smith (2004) point out that religious
texts and practices are open to interpretation, and that interpretation of religion by social
actors explains how the same religious sources are used to promote both violence and
10

peace. Woltering (2002) argues there is little about Islam that accounts for the growth of
political Islam, including its militant varieties, and that we should instead look at political,
social and economic explanations. A range of these alternative explanations – from US
foreign policy to poverty – have been advanced in popular and academic discourse.
Moreover, some scholars argue that Islam mitigates violence (Chittick, 1990; Abu-Nimer,
2000; Fair, 2016) and others point to lower homicide rates in Muslim communities
(Souryal, 1987; Helal & Coston, 1995; Neapolitan, 1997) as evidence of Islam’s peaceful
nature.
The empirical literature provides substantial evidence for the claim that Muslimmajority states are more likely to experience various forms of intrastate conflict. Fox
(2007) and Toft (2007) find that Muslim-majority states experience a disproportionate
number of civil wars. Karakaya (2015), DeMeritt and Young (2013), and Conrad and
Milton (2013) note that these states engage in higher than average levels of repression.
Piazza (2008), Wade and Reiter (2007), Enders and Sandler (2006), and Li (2005) find they
experience an extraordinarily high number of terrorist attacks. But studies attempting to
identify the source of this conflict using statistical analysis have so far endorsed the
‘instrumentalist’ perspective (except for Toft [2007]4). They conclude that common
religion – Islam – is spurious as far as explaining intrastate conflict in these countries.
These studies attempt to determine if Islam is a causal factor by controlling for a
number of other variables in global cross-sectional tests for civil war. Sørli, Gleditsch and

Toft (2007) uses descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis to argue that structural aspects of Islam –
namely jihad which obligates violence in defense of the religion, and its totalistic nature which resists the
separation of the religion from politics – along with the presence of oil and proximity to Israel explain high
levels of civil war in Muslim-majority countries.
4
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Strand (2005) find their Islam variable loses significance to economic development,
economic growth and ethnic dominance. They measure economic development and growth
in terms of GDP which means their tests suffer from severe endogeneity5. This suggests
their correlations may stem from the fact that conflict and the threat of conflict negatively
impacts a country’s GDP, particularly its growth rate. Fish, Jensenius and Michel (2010)
use a similar research design, their Islam variable is not significant in the presence of
fertility rate and authoritarianism. Karakaya (2015) using the same method finds that Islam
is not significant when controlling for development, oil dependency, state repression,
authoritarianism and youth bulges.
De Soysa and Nordås (2007) attempt to determine if Islam causes high levels of
state repression through a similar test. They find that Islam is not a significant predictor
when oil dependence, development and growth (also based on GDP measures),
authoritarianism and ethnic fractionalization are included. A study by DeMeritt and Young
(2013) found that oil wealth is associated with greater state repression. 6 Conrad and Milton
(2013) in a study on the cause of terrorism find that their Islam variable loses significance
to state repression. They argue that terrorism is a response to the state engaging in violent
repression. Moreover, they use the findings in DeMeritt and Young (2013) to claim the
presence of oil wealth – instead of Islam – explains high levels of repression and

5

Endogeneity in the statistical context refers to a situation where the dependent variable is plausibly
influencing the independent variable. In such a situation we can find a correlation between two variables
but are unsure about the causal direction of the relationship. This means we are at significant risk of
mistaking cause for effect.
DeMerrit’s and Young’s (2013) oil abundance variable loses significance in two of their three models when
regional dummies for North Africa and Middle East are included. Regional dummies are dichotomous
variables intended to capture the effects of a region on the dependent variable. This indicates their correlation
is substantially driven by countries in these regions that have higher levels of both oil wealth and repression.
6
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consequently of terrorism in Muslim-majority countries (p. 331). This conclusion ignores
the possibility that state repression is a reaction to terrorism, which presents a serious
endogeneity challenge as discussed by Ritter and Conrad (2016).
The results from these empirical studies show that Islam loses significance to a host
of variables. The authors interpret this to mean that Islam is not associated with conflict
but that Muslim-majority countries happen to be oil dependent, undemocratic,
underdeveloped, fractionalized, repressive and overpopulated which explains their
propensity for civil war, repression and terrorism. There are a number of problems with
this conclusion. First, as noted, endogeneity associated with development, growth and
repression makes it hard to identify the causal direction of these variables. Second, and
more importantly, the conclusion ignores the possibility that Islam influences political and
economic development as well as population trends. We know that socially and legally
enforced Islamic codes impede socio-political gender equality (Rahman, 2012) which a
burgeoning literature argues is critical for political and economic development. Fish (2002)
shows that Islam is robustly associated with autocracy mainly due to the subordination of
women. Gender inequality also leads to higher fertility rates which Muslim populations
reliably exhibit.7 This suggests that Islam loses significance to these variables because they
are channeling its effects on conflict – not because they are coincidental yet exogenous
explanations. Third, and critically, most of these explanatory variables – prominently
authoritarianism and underdevelopment – have been relatively constant or decreasing in

7

It should be noted that seventeen out of the twenty countries with the lowest scores on gender equality in
the Global Gender Gap Index (2015) are Muslim-majority.
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these countries since WWII and thus do not explain the increase in conflict in the Muslim
world.
The research approach taken by these scholars – ‘kitchen sink’ modelling8 – clearly
has difficulty explaining elevated levels of civil war, repression and terrorism in the
Muslim world. These models transfer Islam’s statistical significance to a number of
explanatory variables that correlate with Islam and conflict. The researchers appear to
assume these variables are independently influencing conflict but it can be argued that they
are channeling the effects of Islam on conflict. If we accept the former assumption, that
still raises the question of why these conflict-inducing factors are concentrated in the
Muslim world. But proving the latter argument by testing the relationship between Islam
and underdevelopment (or the any of these other variables) using more ‘kitchen sink’
models may yield another batch of potentially intervening variables that will be similarly
held as independent explanations unless they are compellingly linked to Islam through
more models. Ultimately, addressing the question will require building a number of models
to explicate the complex causal relationships between all these variables. More
importantly, it will require the careful selection and evaluation of variables based on a
robust theoretical framework.

‘Kitchen sink’ models are regressions that use a long list of independent variables. In the social sciences
regression analysis is typically used deductively to test hypotheses but a ‘kitchen sink’ model does not
follow this norm, in this type of model the analyst throws in ‘everything but the kitchen sink’ in hopes of
finding some statistical pattern.
8
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Oil and intrastate conflict
A handful of Western companies – the so-called ‘Seven Sisters’ – dominated the
global oil industry and collected most of its profits until the early seventies (Ross, 2011b).
The governments of developing oil producing countries did not have access to oil funds
until they nationalized these companies, partly to take advantage of the drastic price hikes
after the Arab oil embargo in 1973. Since then incumbent elites in these states have had
access to immense wealth. The effects of this oil wealth were the subject of intense study
by political scientists and economists through the eighties and nineties. More recently, the
discovery of oil reserves in a number of developing countries, particularly in Africa, has
renewed interest in the effects of oil on development, politics and violence (Noland &
Hendrix, 2014: p. 2).
The relationship between oil and intrastate conflict is explicated by two competing
perspectives – often referred to as the ‘rentier state’ and ‘resource curse’ models. The
former is based on case studies of Middle Eastern states by Madhavy (1970) and the latter
on case studies of South American states by Auty (1993). Both models predict that oil
produces significant revenue which enable incumbent elites to entrench themselves and
therefore increases authoritarianism. Both also predict that oil revenues lead to currency
appreciation which devitalizes other sections of the economy and therefore leads to general
economic stagnation. But proponents of the ‘resource curse’ started emphasizing the
conflict-inducing tendencies of authoritarianism and economic stagnation, and identifying
other mechanisms through which they said oil wealth encourages conflict. In response,
proponents of ‘rentier state’ stressed the stabilizing effects of authoritarianism, economic
underdevelopment and rent distribution. Consequently, supporters of the models disagree
15

about the impact of oil on intrastate conflict as is evident in the empirical literature. The
first part of this section discusses the empirical literature supporting the ‘resource curse’
perspective and the second part discusses the same for the ‘rentier state’ model.
A pioneering large-n study by Sachs and Warner (1995) found a correlation
between natural resources, measured as the ratio of primary commodity exports to total
exports, and low economic growth. A subsequent study by Collier and Hoeffler (1998)
argued the same measure of natural resources affects civil war onset and duration. But De
Soysa (2002) noted this measure of natural sources does not effectively capture resource
abundance or scarcity. Poor countries have a higher proportion of their exports devoted to
primary goods because they have few industrial goods to trade. In countries where
industries do exist, conflict or impending conflict is going to hinder or stop industrial
production, whereas the primary sector tends to be more resilient. This suggests Collier’s
and Hoeffler’s (1998) natural resource measure is capturing underdevelopment and/or
political instability – not resources per se – and that these realities are driving their
correlation.
De Soysa (2002) adopts a measure to mitigate this endogeneity issue – national
stocks per capita – which the World Bank (1997) describes as the ‘entire environmental
patrimony of the country’. He includes a separate term for sub-soil (mineral) assets and a
dummy variable for oil exporters in particular. He finds that total natural resources are
unrelated to conflict, but that mineral assets are highly significant, and that mineral assets
lose all their significance to the oil variable. The finding that only oil matters is echoed by
Fearson and Laitin (2003) who use Collier and Hoeffler’s (1998) measures but a new (and
influential) model specification; they find primary commodities as a whole are not robustly
16

linked to civil war but oil has significant effects. This is further supported by Ross’ (2004)
review of fourteen quantitative studies on the resource-conflict link which finds only oil
producing countries are comparatively prone to civil war onset. Lastly, another meta-study
by Dixon (2009) also concludes that oil is the only resource robustly linked to civil war.
The oil measure used by most of the studies establishing oil as the only natural
resource robustly linked to civil war has been disputed. Humphreys (2005) and Ross (2006)
criticize the oil exports as percent of GDP measures used by Fearson and Laitin (2003),
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearson (2005) for the same endogeneity problem raised
by de Soysa (2002) with regards to the aggregated natural resources measure. Instead
Humphrey (2005) utilizes oil production and reserves per capita and Ross (2006) uses onshore hydrocarbon rents per capita. Both find a statistically significant relationship between
their oil variables and civil war onset but with important qualifications. Humphrey’s (2005)
results are at best ambiguous for industrialized (‘Weberian’) states; Ross’ (2006)
correlation loses significance if two of its most influential observations are dropped, if the
GDP-per-capita control variable is dropped, and importantly if regional dummies are
included.9
From the ‘rentier state’ prospective, Smith (2004) was the first to incorporate the
‘rentier state’ perspective in his large-n analysis on the link between oil revenue and civil
war. It should be recalled the ‘rentier state’ model predicts that countries with an abundance
of natural resources are more likely to be politically stable and are less prone to civil war.
Smith (2004) finds that his oil exports as percent of GDP measure predicts slightly

The fact that Ross’ (2006) correlation loses significance to regional dummies indicates these regions are
driving the correlation. It should be remembered that DeMerrit’s and Young’s (2013) correlation between
oil and repression reacted similarly to the inclusion of regional dummies.
9
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decreased chances of civil war in developing countries. This oil variable is likely
endogenous to civil war, but according to de Soysa’s (2002), Humphreys’ (2005), Ross’
(2006) critiques of the variable that should bias his results towards a positive correlation.
Basedau and Lay (2009) attempt to reconcile the ‘rentier state’ and ‘resource curse’
perspectives by stressing the distinction between oil abundance and dependence. The
former allows rentier states to distribute a sufficient amount of rent to coopt or coerce
opposition and the latter generates violent competition over scare resources. They note that
previous studies do not report the results of squared terms or logged measures of the oil
variables and thus ignore nonlinear effects stemming from possible interaction between the
two mechanisms. They use oil revenue per capita as a measure of abundance and oil
revenues/GDP for dependence in their model on civil war onset. Their results exhibit a
curvilinear relationship between oil abundance and civil war onset, with greater oil
dependence increasing the height of the curve. They further use macro-qualitative analysis
to reinforce the argument that countries rich in oil in per capita terms overcome the negative
effects on conflict associated with oil dependence.
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) argue that oil dependence is endogenous to
conflict. They use a regression equation to show that oil dependence measured as oilexports/GDP is greatly influenced by prior conflict and instability. This substantiates the
endogeneity concerns raised by de Soysa (2002), Humphreys (2005), Ross (2006) and
others. Moreover, they show that controlling for past conflict removes oil dependence’s
statistical significance as a predictor of civil war onset. This suggests that conflict-prone
countries become dependent on oil because other sectors of their economy are unable to
mature and that oil dependence does not induce conflict. Lastly, they use per capita
18

production and reserves data from Humphreys (2005) to demonstrate that oil abundance
has a significant negative relationship with the onset of civil war, which echoes Basedau’s
and Lay’s (2009) results. However, since they found oil dependence to be a non-factor,
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) claim their findings decisively support the ‘rentier state’
model.
There is reason to remain concerned about endogeneity associated with oil per
capita measures even though they are better than oil export ratio variables. As Ross (2004)
points out, poor countries may exploit more natural resources because they place a lower
value on environmental protection, conversely they may under-exploit if they lack requisite
capital and infrastructure or if they suffer from absent or low-quality governance.
Consequently, Cotet and Tsui (2013) use the worth of oil reserves as their independent
variable; using a pooled cross-sectional time series test, they find it is associated with a
higher likelihood of civil war, echoing de Soysa’s (2002) results. However, controlling for
country fixed effects eliminates its significance. This implies that within-country variation
in oil reserves does not predict civil war, and reinforces Brunnshweiler’s and Bulte’s
(2009) argument that the oil-civil war link is spurious. Nonetheless, if estimates of oil
reserves are also endogenous to conflict, it is important to devise a test accounting for this
endogeneity. As a second strategy, Cotet and Tsui (2013) exploit changes in oil reserves
due to variation in the success of oil explorations, conditional on a serious attempt to find
oil. In other words, conditional on exploration intensity, they treat the discovery of oil as
exogenous and test its impact on conflict. They find little robust evidence that oil
discoveries cause civil conflict or other measures of political violence. Instead they find oil
discoveries increase military spending in nondemocratic countries.
19

Those studies looking specifically at the link between oil wealth and repression or
terrorism are comparatively fewer. DeMeritt and Young (2013) argue that oil revenues
minimize states’ disincentive to repress their populace by providing an independent source
of revenue, they find that fuel rents per capita predict greater state repression. Young (2012)
and Conrad and Milton (2013) argue that state repression in turn provokes insurgency and
terrorism respectively. Additionally, if oil wealth inspires rebel greed or provides rebels
with resources, that may trigger repression; if oil fosters relative deprivation that may
provoke terrorism. There are numerous potential mechanisms through which oil wealth
could encourage civil war, repression and terrorism but they are difficult to discern and
evaluate using only large-n quantitative techniques.
The studies talked about in this section employ a variety of oil measures, measures
of intrastate conflict, data sources for both, country samples (across space and time), model
specifications, and model types. Understandably, they produce differing findings about if
and how oil wealth relates to civil war. Nonetheless, a couple of patterns can be identified.
First, the validity of results is tied to the oil measure employed and all oil measures suffer
a degree and type of endogeneity. Second, studies that attempt to address endogeneity as
part of their design tend to find no association or a negative association between oil wealth
and civil war – but compared to those reporting a positive link, they are few in number.
Basedau and Lay (2009), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009), and Cotet and Tsui (2013)
collectively present a compelling challenge to ‘resource curse’ claims about civil war but
it appears this has not sunk into the collective consciousness (see Koubi et al., 2014). The
positive oil resource-civil war link remains a stylized assumption.
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Hypotheses
As noted in the literature review, intrastate conflict is usually proxied by civil war,
which is measured by the number of combatant deaths inflicted in conflict between the
state and a non-state faction (see Sambanis [2004]). I add two more variables – repression
and terrorism – to proxy for intrastate conflict. Repression is usually measured as the level
of state violence inflicted on non-combatants (see Davenport and Inman [2012]). Terrorism
is usually measured as violence against non-combatants by a non-state faction to further
political goals (see Young and Findley [2011]). I incorporate the latter two variables into
my test to account for important types of violence that are not captured by conventional
intrastate conflict measures but which characterize much of the violence in Muslimmajority countries. The inclusion of proxies for repression and terrorism allows me to
measure violence directed at civilians and identify which faction is perpetrating it. Given
that these measures have not been incorporated into the same test before, it will also yield
new insights on causal mechanisms that link oil to intrastate conflict. Moreover, these
proxies are mutually exclusive, but they are likely to coincide heavily, which means they
serve as a robustness check. The first hypothesis is that oil measures correlate with civil
war. The second hypothesis is that oil measures correlate with state repression. The third
hypothesis is that oil measures correlate with terrorism.
The empirical literature on Islam and intrastate conflict reveals that Muslimmajority states systematically experience higher levels of civil conflict, repression and
terrorism. Studies have sought to identify the cause using cross-sectional tests with a global
sample of countries while controlling for a number of potential causal variables. We found
that in such tests Islam loses its statistical significance to other variables known to be
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associated with conflict – development, democratization, fertility rates, youth bulges, oil
revenue – leading some scholars to claim that these variables instead of Islam are
responsible for higher levels of intrastate conflict in the Muslim world. But this ignores the
possibility (and in some cases evidence) of Islam influencing levels of development,
democratization, ethnic fractionalization, fertility rates and youth bulges, which would
mean these variables are channeling the effects of Islam on conflict. Moreover, most of
these factors do not explain the temporal trend of conflict in these countries. Advancing
this body of literatures requires explicating the relationships between Islam and these
variables using a chain of models based on a robust theoretical framework. This would be
a worthwhile but substantial research endeavor.
Given the strong possibility that almost all these causal variables are endogenous
to Islam, this study restricts itself to analyzing the impact of one prominent variable – oil
resources – that is indisputably exogenous. Moreover, oil is the only variable that is highly
concentrated in the Muslim world and predicts a cumulative rise of conflict in these
countries. In terms of case selection, this test employs data exclusively on Muslim-majority
countries. This approach exploits the significant variation in conflict levels within the
Muslim world to identify the most proximate causes of intrastate conflict. It has a few
advantages. First, it accounts for the possibility that oil revenues influence Muslimmajority countries differently as argued by Noreng (1997). Second, it helps distinguish
between variables that are spuriously linked to conflict because they are associated with
Muslim-majority countries in general (e.g. oil) and those that are more directly tied to
conflict in the Muslim world. Third, it sidesteps the question of whether Islam – an
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amorphous, complex and disputed concept – is causing conflict by focusing on what is
correlating with conflict when Islam is held as a constant.
The review of the empirical literature about the link between oil and intrastate
conflict reveals that results largely depend on the oil measure used, and that all oil measures
are likely contaminated by endogeneity. I address the measurement issue by including all
measurement types as proxies for the independent variable. This does not fix the
endogeneity problem, but testing the various measures does allow me to gauge the validity
of the purported oil-conflict link in the extant literature. Moreover, given the data
limitations, incorporating all extant measures in the test will maximize internal validity,
and allow to me identify which if any of the measures relate to intrastate conflict. By
including the following measures, I can distinguish between the impact of oil dependence
and abundance, and of oil reserves and production. Lastly, given that all these measures
have not been incorporated in a single test before, they will yield new insights into the
causal mechanisms linking oil wealth to intrastate conflict. The first part (a) of the
hypotheses uses dependence – oil revenue as percent of GDP – as the oil measure. The
second part (b) uses abundance in terms of production – oil production per capita – as the
oil measure. The third part (c) uses abundance in terms of revenue – oil revenue per capita
– as the oil measure. The fourth part (d) uses abundance in terms of reserves – oil reserves
per capita – as the oil measure.
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In summary, the first hypothesis will test the correlation between oil measures and
civil war.
H1a: Oil revenue/GDP predicts civil war in Muslim-majority states.
H1b: Oil production per capita predicts civil war in Muslim-majority states
H1c: Oil revenue per capita predicts civil war in Muslim-majority states
H1d: Oil reserves per capita predicts civil war in Muslim-majority states
The second hypothesis will test the correlation between oil measures and
repression.
H2a: Oil revenue/GDP predicts repression in Muslim-majority states.
H2b: Oil production per capita predicts repression in Muslim-majority states
H2c: Oil revenue per capita predicts repression in Muslim-majority states
H2d: Oil reserves per capita predicts repression in Muslim-majority states
The third hypothesis will test the correlation between the oil measures and
terrorism.
H3a: Oil revenue/GDP predicts terrorism in Muslim-majority states.
H3b: Oil production per capita predicts terrorism in Muslim-majority states.
H3c: Oil revenue per capita predicts terrorism in Muslim-majority states
H3d: Oil reserves per capita predicts terrorism in Muslim-majority state
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Chapter Three: Data
This section discusses the independent and dependent variables used in these tests.
The former are also known as the causal variables, which we expect to influence the latter,
which are also known as the responding variables. The section provides a summary of the
meaning, type, sources, coverage, strengths and weaknesses of these data. This data starts
from the early eighties by which time oil producing Muslim-majority countries had
nationalized oil extraction and started absorbing oil revenue up to 2011 when the ‘Arab
Spring’ took place. This temporal cut-off point is not arbitrary but due to the unavailability
of data on two of the dependent variables.
Case selection
In order to isolate potentially unique effects of oil on the Muslim world as well as
variables that are directly tied to conflict in the Muslim world while helping to rule out the
impacts of Islam as discussed previously, this test uses data exclusively on Muslimmajority states. To that end, the cases under study are all countries where more than 50
percent of the population identifies as Muslim. The result is a list of 53 such countries that
provides more than enough variance on other potentially relevant variables. 10

10

These Muslim-majority countries are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Brunei, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger,
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan,
Gambia, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen.
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Independent variables
There are four independent variables capturing the various ways oil has been
measured in previous studies. It should be noted that the first independent variable captures
oil dependence whereas the latter three capture oil abundance. These variables were chosen
because all studies making claims about the oil-conflict link have used one or more of these
measurement types. However, no study to my knowledge has incorporated all four of these
measures into a single study before.
Oil revenue as percentage of GDP
The first independent variable is oil revenue which is the difference between the
value of crude oil at world prices and total costs of production of crude oil in the state
(World Bank, 2011). Oil revenue as percent of GDP is the percentage of the state’s GDP
that is derived from oil revenues. This data is drawn from the World Bank (2011) database
and includes thirty country-years for all Muslim-majority states from 1981-2011.
Oil production per capita
The next independent variable is oil production which is the average amount of oil
extracted – measured in millions of barrels – per day in a given year. Oil production per
capita is oil production divided by the population which gives us the number of barrels (in
millions) a country produces per person. This data is drawn from Humphreys (2005) and
includes 19 country-years from 1981-1999. It also does not include a number of Muslimmajority states including the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar.
Oil revenue per capita
The third independent variable measures the state’s value of oil revenues per person
in US dollars. This variable is employed as an alternative per capita measure given the
26

Humphreys (2005) variable’s limited coverage and includes all 30 country-years from
1981-2011.11 I computed it using data from the World Bank (2011) and the formula:
𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 = [(

𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 % 𝐺𝐷𝑃
100

) ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃]⁄𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 .

Oil reserves per capita
The fourth independent variable is a measure of the estimated recoverable volume
of oil – in billions of barrels – remaining in the ground. Oil reserves per capita is oil reserves
divided by the population which gives us the number of barrels (in billions) a country
processes per person. This data is drawn from Humphreys (2005) and also includes only
19 country-years from 1981-1999 and fewer countries.
Dependent variables
There are three dependent variables. The first variable is most widely used to
measure intrastate political violence but I supplement it with two more variables. It should
be noted that the first variable captures combatant deaths whereas the other two capture
civilian casualties caused by state and non-state forces respectively. Lastly, the first two
dependent variables contain ordinal levels of measurement and the third dependent variable
is an interval measure.
Civil war
The first dependent variable is an ordinal measure capturing the number of battle
deaths in a country-year. A value of 0 indicates less than 25 battle deaths (referred to as
‘no conflict’); 1 indicates greater than 25 battle deaths (referred to as ‘civil conflict’); 2
indicates greater than 1,000 battle deaths (referred to as ‘civil war’). This data is drawn

11

Moreover, oil revenue is a better measure than oil production because it captures profit from oil exports
instead of just the raw number of barrels produced.
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from Harbom’s, Lotta’s and Peter Wallensteen’s (2012) version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict database and includes all 30 country-years used in this study.
Repression
The second dependent variable is the Physical Rights Index which is an ordinal
variable representing levels of state repression. The data is drawn from the CIRI Human
Rights (2014) project and includes thirty country-years for almost all Muslim-majority
countries. The following table displays the type and level of repression associated with the
index scores. (It should be noted a lower score in the index indicates a lack of protection
for physical rights).
Scale Score
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
(Table I)

Disappearances
Common
Common
Common
Common
Common
Common
Occasional
Occasional
Absent

Killing
Common
Common
Common
Occasional
Occasional
Occasional
Occasional
Absent
Absent

Imprisonment
Common
Common
Occasional
Occasional
Absent
Absent
Absent
Absent
Absent

Torture
Common
Occasional
Occasional
Occasional
Occasional
Absent
Absent
Absent
Absent

Terrorism
The third dependent variable is an interval variable taken from the Global Terrorism
Database representing the number of terrorist attacks in the country-year. The data was
compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (2006) and includes all 30 country-years relevant to this study.
This section has explained all seven variables employed in this study. It is worth
stressing that the two independent variables drawn from Humphreys (2005) – oil
production per capita and oil reserves per capita – are weak in terms of temporal and
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geographic coverage. They have only seventeen out of the thirty country-years analyzed in
this study. They are also missing a number of important Muslim-majority states. I included
these variables in the test because better data is not available and these measurement
categories are an important part of the oil-conflict claim. But these variables must be
viewed with a little extra skepticism. The next section uses statistical analysis of these data
to evaluate the purported oil-intrastate conflict relationship.
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Chapter Four: Tests
This section exhibits and discusses the results of the sub-hypotheses. The
relationship between the variables in each of these sub-hypotheses is explicated through an
analysis of the scatterplot followed by analysis of the regression output which includes the
coefficient, statistical significance, standard error and confidence interval. I employ logistic
regression for the tests in H1 and H2 because this analytical technique is better suited to
their ordinal dependent variables but in tests for H3 I utilize simple linear regression given
that its dependent variable is interval. I have lagged all the independent variables by one
year to mitigate endogeneity similar to Humphreys (2005).
Oil and civil war
H1a: Oil revenue/GDP is correlated with civil war
The scatterplot below (Figure IV) has 400 observations and illustrates the general
relationship between the variables. Most of the country-years that experienced civil war
get 20 percent or less of their GDP from oil revenue. Only eight country-years with oil
revenues greater than 40 percent of their GDP experienced civil war. Country-years that
experienced civil conflict are relatively evenly distributed below the 40 percent point on
the oil-revenue-to-GDP scale with the exception of three country-years. Countries that
experienced neither civil war nor conflict heavily populate the scale up to 70 percent. The
handful of country-years with more than 70 percent of their GDP based on oil revenue
experienced neither civil war or conflict.
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(Figure IV)
An ordered logistic regression is used to explicate the relationship (Table II). An
odds ratio of 0.9824 indicates that for a percentage increase in GDP from oil revenue the
odds of civil war as opposed to civil conflict or no conflict decrease by 1.76 percent. A ten
percent increase in GDP from oil revenue would decrease the odds of the country
experiencing more intense conflict by about 17.6 percent and so forth. It should be noted
that this relationship is statistically significant.
Civil war
Oil % of GDP
(Table II)

Odds Ratio
0.9860786

p>|z|
0.002

Std. Err.
0.0045611

95% Conf. Interval
0.97717 – 0.99505

H1b: Oil production per capita is correlated with civil war
The scatterplot (Figure V) exhibits the notable relationship between the two
variables. Country-years with civil wars do not have a production rate of more than 0.1
million barrels per person per day (with one exception). Country-years with civil conflict
do not have a production rate of more than 0.25. Whereas most country-years with no
conflict have production rates higher than 0.25.
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(Figure V)
An ordered logistic regression (Table III) yields a statistically significant odds ratio
of 0.0005 which indicates that for 1 million barrels increase in the per capita production
rate of oil the probably of a country-year experiencing higher levels of conflict is reduced
by almost one hundred percent. This relationship is statistically significant.
Civil war
Oil Prod PC
(Table III)

Odds Ratio
0.0005196

p>|z|
0.000

Std. Err.
0.0009929

95% Conf. Interval
0.00001 – 0.02198

H1c: Oil revenue per capita is correlated with civil war
The scatterplot (Figure VI) shows that country-years experiencing civil war or
conflict do not have per capita revenues of more than 3,000 US dollars with one exception.
Whereas a significant number of country-years with no conflict have per capita oil revenues
greater than 3,000 US dollars.
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(Figure VI)
An ordered logistic regression provides an odds ratio of 0.99945 which indicates
that a thousand dollars’ increase in oil revenue per capita results in 54.14 percent decrease
in the odds of experiencing higher levels of conflict.
Civil war
Oil Rev PC
(Table IV)

Odds Ratio
0.99946

p>|z|
0.000

Std. Err.
0.0000921

95% Conf. Interval
0.99928 – 0.99964

H1d: Oil reserves per capita is correlated with civil war
The scatterplot (Figure VII) illustrates that country-years that experienced civil war
or conflict did not have oil reserves greater than 8 billion barrels per capita. A substantial
number of country-years that did not experience either civil war or conflict have oil
reserves greater than 8 billion barrels per person. A number of these ‘no conflict’ countryyears have reserves in excess of 40 billion barrels per capita. This relationship is
statistically significant.
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(Figure VII)
An ordered logistic regression indicates that one billion barrels increase in per
capita oil reserve lowers the risk of a country-year experiencing a higher level of conflict
by almost 15 percent. A 20 billion barrels increase in per capita oil reserve would decrease
the probably of the country-year experiencing higher levels of conflict by about 300
percent. This relationship is statistically significant.
Civil war
Oil Res PC
(Table V)

Odds Ratio
0.8506785

p>|z|
0.005

Std. Err.
0.0489703

95% Conf. Interval
0.75991 – 0.95228

To conclude the H1 tests, the results indicate a significant and negative associated
between all oil measures and civil war intensity. Precisely comparing the strength of the
relationships across oil measures is challenging given they employ different units but
estimations can be made. The strongest negative correlation with civil war intensity appears
to be displayed by oil revenue per capita and oil reserves per capita but oil revenue as
percent of GDP and oil production per capita also exhibit substantive relationships. These
results strongly undermine arguments for a positive link between oil and civil conflict.
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Oil and repression
H2a: Oil revenue/GDP is correlated with repression
The scatterplot12 (Figure VIII) exhibits the null findings of the test. Country-years
with varying levels of oil revenue are distributed fairly evenly across the Physical Rights
Index.

(Figure VIII)
The result from the ordered logistic regression is not statistically significant. It
appears that oil revenues as a percent of GDP have no discernable impact on the Physical
Rights Index.
Repression
Oil % GDP
(Table VI)

Odds Ratio
1.000607

p>|z|
0.853

Std. Err.
0.0033212

95% Conf. Interval
0.99418 – 1.00707

H2b: Oil production per capita is correlated with repression
The scatterplot (Figure IX) suggests a notable relationship between the variables.
Country-years with PRI score 0-3 do not have production rates of more than 0.5 million

12

I have flipped the axes on the scatterplots in H2 to assist with analysis.

35

barrels per capita with one exception. Whereas a number of countries with PRI from 4-8
have production rates of more than 0.5 million barrels. A sizable number of country-years
with a PRI score of 7-8 – indicating the least repression – produce greater than 0.25 million
barrels of oil per citizen.

(Figure IX)
The ordered logistic regression produces a statistically significant odds ratio of
3.903 which indicates that a quarter million barrels increase in per capita oil production
increases the likelihood of the country-year achieving a higher PRI score by about 97
percent.
Repression
Oil % of GDP
(Table VII)

Odds Ratio
3.903775

p>|z|
0.004

Std. Err.
1.834301

95% Conf. Interval
1.55425 – 9.80497

H2c: Oil revenue per capita is correlated with repression
The scatterplot (Figure X) illustrates the strong relationship between the variables.
Country-years with PRI from 1-3 do not have per capita oil revenue greater than 3,000 US
dollar with a handful of exceptions. Country-years with mid PRI score from 3-5 do not
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have greater per capita oil revenue than 10,000 dollars with a few exceptions. Countryyears with high PRI score (6-8) populate the scale heavily to the 10,000 dollars’ threshold
and about twenty of them have higher per capita oil revenue up to the 30,000 dollars mark.

(Figure X)
The ordered logistic regression yields a statistically significant odds ratio of
1.000169 which indicates that 5,000 dollars increase in per capita oil revenue will increase
the likelihood of the country scoring higher on the PRI score by 84.5 percent. A 10,000
dollars increase in per capita oil revenue would increase the probability of a higher PRI
score by 169 percent and so forth.
Repression
Oil Rev PC
(Table VII)

Odds Ratio
1.000187

p>|z|
0.000

Std. Err.
0.0000203

95% Conf. Interval
1.00014 – 1.00022

H2d: Oil reserves per capita is correlated with repression
The scatterplot (Figure XI) exhibits a noticeable relationship between the two
variables. Country-years with greater than 40 billion barrels in per capita reserves are in
the upper half of the PRI scale (with one exception).
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(Figure XI)
The ordered logistic regression yields a marginally significant odds ratio of
1.017681 which suggests that an increase of ten billion barrels in per capita oil reserves
results in a 17.68 percent increase in likelihood of the country-year achieving a higher PRI
score.
Repression
Oil Res PC
(Table VIII)

Odds Ratio
1.017681

p>|z|
0.08

Std. Err.
0.0102029

95% Conf. Interval
0.99787 – 1.03787

The results from the H2 tests exhibit no significant correlation for oil revenue as
percent of GDP which is the oil dependence variable. The three oil abundance variables
relate negatively and significantly with state repression. The strongest correlation is
displayed by oil production per capita and oil reserves per capita. Oil reserves per capita
demonstrates a notable correlation.
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Oil and terrorism
H3a: Oil revenue/GDP is correlated with terrorism
The scatterplot (Figure XII) illustrates the relationship between the two variables.
A significant number of the terrorism prone country-years are those that derive 0 percent
of their GDP from oil revenue. Another significant cluster of terrorism prone country-years
get between 5 to 20 percent of their GDP from oil revenue. There is also a cluster of about
five country-years experiencing a slight elevation in terrorist attacks at the 30 percent mark.
Only 7 terrorism afflicted country-years derive more than 40 percent of their GDP from oil
revenue. This suggests a weak curvilinear trend.

(Figure XII)
A linear regression yields a coefficient of 0.5182 which indicates that a 20 percent
increase amount of GDP derived from oil revenues results in an increase of 10 terrorist
attacks in the country-year. This result is statistically significant.
Terrorism
Oil % GDP
(Table IX)

Coefficient
0.5324304

p>|z|
0.003
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Std. Err.
0.1807538

95% Conf. Interval
0.17780 – 0.88705

H3b: Oil production per capita is correlated with terrorism
The scatterplot (Figure XIII) demonstrates the relationship between the variables.
Country-years will per capita production close to zero experience a significant number of
terrorist attacks. Country-years per capita oil production greater than 0.1 do not experience
a salient number of terrorist attacks.

(Figure XIII)
The linear regression attests to this trend. The coefficient of -29.6062 indicates that
an increase in 0.5 million barrels in per capita oil production decreases the number of
terrorist attacks by about 15. This result is marginally significant.
Terrorism
Oil % GDP
(Table X)

Coefficient
-29.6062

p>|z|
0.035

Std. Err.
0.0033354

95% Conf. Interval
-57.16157 – 2.05084

H3c: Oil revenue per capita is correlated with repression
The scatterplot exhibits (Figure XIV) the relationship between the variables. Most
of the country-years with terrorist attacks have close to zero oil revenue per capita. About
a dozen country-years with the most terrorist attacks have slightly higher oil revenue per
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capita. But no country-year with more than 25,000 dollars per capita in oil revenue has a
salient number of terrorist attacks.

(Figure XIV)
The linear regression identifies a negative relationship but does not produce a
statistically significant result.
Terrorism
Oil Rev PC
(Table X1)

Coefficient
- 0.0013887

p>|z|
0.099

Std. Err.
0.0008414

95% Conf. Interval
-0.00303 – 0.00026

H3d: Oil reserves per capita is correlated with terrorism
The scatterplot (Figure XV) shows that those country-years with noticeable levels
of terrorism have per capita oil reserves close to zero. In contrast country-years with per
capita oil reserves greater than 1 billion barrels do not have a salient number of terrorist
attacks.
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(Figure XV)
The linear regression produces negative but statistically insignificant relationship.
Terrorism
Oil Res PC
(Table XII)

Coefficient
-0.472164

p>|z|
0.144

Std. Err.
0.3231533

95% Conf. Interval
-1.10675 – 0.16242

The results produced by H3 are the least robust. The correlation between the oil
dependence variable and terrorism is the only negative relationship in the study but not of
a substantive magnitude. Neither is the positive correlation between oil production per
capita and terrorism. Both oil revenue and reserves per capita failed to achieve statistical
significance with terrorism.
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Chapter Five: Discussion
The tests reveal a strong negative relationship between all four measures of oil and
civil war. They also display a strong negative relationship between two of the oil measures
and repression while the other two are negative but did not achieve statistical significance.
Two of the oil measures exhibited statistically significant relationships with terrorism, one
positive and one negative, while the other two were negative but did not achieve statistical
significance.
This provides compelling evidence that the ‘rentier state’ as opposed to ‘resource
curse’ model is channeling the effects of oil on conflict in the Muslim world. Muslimmajority states with oil, especially moderate to high levels of oil, are less likely to
experience civil conflict and war. Moreover, these states are also less likely to repress their
citizenry, which implies that these states are averting civil conflict through non-violent
means. This could be through cooption or deterrence – both of which would be easier with
oil wealth. Lastly, the negative relationship between oil and terrorism while apparent is
least robust. This aligns with the view that terrorism requires relatively smaller
mobilization compared to insurgency, and is therefore not a good indicator of wider
economic or political grievances (Dreher and Kreibaum, 2016). Moreover, this terrorism
measure tracks the location of attacks as opposed to the nationality of perpetrators. It is
easier to engage in cross-border terrorism than cross-border insurgency, which suggests
this result at least partly reflects cross-border spillover of terrorist operatives into oil rich
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countries. Nonetheless, this result does not suggest that oil rich states are more prone to
triggering or experiencing terrorist attacks.
Oil dependence relates negatively and significantly with civil war, negatively but
insignificantly with repression, and positively and significantly with terrorism. All
measures of oil abundance – per capita production, revenues and reserves – show a negative
relationship with civil war, repression and terrorism. Oil production per capita relates
negatively and significantly with civil war, repression and terrorism. Oil revenue per capita
relate negatively with all three dependent variables but fails to achieve significance with
terrorism. Oil reserves per capita relates negatively and significantly with civil war but fails
to achieve significance with repression and terrorism.
The finding that oil dependence has a substantively negative impact on civil conflict
contradicts a significant number of studies (e.g. Fearson and Laitin, 2003; Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004: Fearson, 2005) that find a positive link between oil dependence and civil
conflict. None of these studies employ a sample of exclusively Muslim-majority countries
which is the most likely explanation for this contradictory finding. It appears oil
dependence reduces the risk of civil conflict in Muslim-majority states; this in interesting
because even scholars denying the oil-conflict link acknowledge that this measure of oil
wealth is positively linked to conflict. I interpret this result to mean the stabilizing effects
of oil on Muslim-majority states are enough to overcome the fact that conflict-prone
countries become dependent on oil. Muslim-majority countries’ dependence oil does not
seem to be an outcome of conflict as argued by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) but of oil
abundance.
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My finding that oil abundance is associated with reduced levels of civil war
contradicts the claims made by a host of studies (notably De Soysa, 2002; Humphreys,
2005; Ross, 2006) and supports arguments made by others (Smith, 2004; Basedau and Lay,
2009; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Cotet and Tsui, 2013). My results on the
relationship between oil abundance and repression contradict the claim made by DeMeritt
and Young (2013). Lastly, my results on the relationship between oil abundance and
terrorism contradict Conrad and Milton (2013) who claim that ‘domestic human rights
abuses, discrimination against minorities, and repressive policies made possible through
oil wealth erase the apparent effect [on terrorism] of a state’s inclusion in the Muslim
subsample’ (p. 331) given that among Muslim-majority states oil abundance does not
positively correlate with repression or terrorism.
These conflicting results also likely stem from the difference in the selection of
samples. For instance, DeMeritt and Young (2013) when arguing for a correlation between
oil wealth and repression employ ‘a globally representative sample of 141 countries’ (p.
103) of which 28 are Muslim-majority which is lower than the proportion of Muslimmajority countries in the global population. 13 In contrast, my study employs only and all
fifty Muslim-majority countries. Understandably, conclusions by studies that employ a
global sample of countries are more authoritative about the global oil-conflict link
compared to my study which produces findings about the oil-conflict link in the Muslim

13

DeMerrit and Young (2013) include a measure of the percentage of Muslim population as a robustness
test and find that all three of their repression measures stay positive and significant. However, when they
include indicators for North African and Middle Eastern states two of their three repression measures lose
significance (p. 111). This hints that MENA Muslim-majority states in particular are driving their
correlation. But their sample has only about half of the Muslim-majority countries and it is unclear how
these countries were selected, which means these results must be interpreted with some reservation, at least
with regard to Muslim-majority countries.
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world. But my results do align with a number of studies that use global samples and
advocate the ‘rentier state’ model of the oil-conflict link (e.g. Smith, 2004; Basedau and
Lay, 2009; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Cotet and Tsui, 2013). Furthermore, two
points should be noted. First, Muslim-majority countries constitute about a quarter of the
world’s countries, which in itself is a substantive sample. Second, Muslim-majority
countries produce about 40 percent of the world’s oil. Consequently, even though I limited
my sample to Muslim-majority states for the reasons explained above, my study
significantly qualifies claims about a global ‘resource curse’ link between oil and intrastate
conflict.
As indicated in the literature review, large-n studies that oppose ‘resource curse’
arguments are more compelling. Nonetheless, my results provide exceptionally strong
support for the ‘rentier state’ model with regards to conflict. This indicates that Muslimmajority countries with an abundance of oil are less likely to experience civil war,
repression and terrorism compared to others. Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority
states may be reacting differently to oil wealth in terms of intrastate conflict because the
former may be more ethnically and religiously homogenous, and/or because they may have
tribal kinship networks that allow for more effective distribution of oil wealth, and/or
because their societies may not have achieved the level of political organization required
to mount meaningful opposition against wealthy regimes, and/or some other reason.
Exploring this divergence may be a rewarding avenue for further research but is
unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper which suffices with the claim that oil revenues
appear particularly effective in reducing conflict in Muslim-majority countries.
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Chapter Six: Implications
This paper is motivated by the question of why intrastate conflict is
disproportionally concentrated in Muslim-majority states. It is devoted to evaluating oil as
an alleged cause of this violence. The analysis of the Islam-conflict literature reveals that
despite weak evidence oil is held as an important explanation for political violence in the
Muslim world. Evaluating the literature on the purported positive oil-conflict link reveals
it is more tenuous than commonly assumed and likely an outcome of imperfect
measurement. I address this by including all the various oil measurements in my test
involving all Muslim-majority countries over a thirty-year period. I also employ three
different proxies for intrastate conflict to capture various forms of violence and enhance
robustness. The analysis in this paper provides powerful evidence to counter claims that
oil causes civil war, repression or terrorism in Muslim-majority countries. It instead finds
that hydrocarbon revenues produce significant conflict mitigating effects through means
other than repression.
The test in this study did not include country-years beyond 2011 due to data
deficiencies but the proceeding events of the ‘Arab Spring’ can be seen as a natural
experiment supporting its conclusions. The wave of revolutionary protests affected all
countries in the Arab world. The states that experienced the most violence – Syria, Libya,
Yemen, Bahrain – made an average of 1,648 dollars in per capita oil revenue compared to
states that suffered the least violence – Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE – that made
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an average of 14,199 dollars in per capita oil revenue. Writing for the New York Times,
Anderson (2016) discusses how these oil rich regimes avoided major protests by dolling
out cash and subsidies to the populace. Oil abundance does not perfectly predict the level
of violence experienced by states during the ‘Arab Spring’ – Bahrain made slightly more
in oil revenue per capita than Oman – which indicates other important dynamics are
involved. But the trend clearly shows states rich in oil in per capita terms avoiding violence
in this period.
This study has a number of implications for the real-world. We know the Muslim
world is experiencing disproportionately high levels of intrastate conflict, but this study
demonstrates that oil revenues are not a source of this conflict, and are significantly
mitigating it. In particular, this study indicates oil revenues are mitigating conflict through
non-violent mechanisms. The ‘resource curse’ as well as ‘rentier state’ body of literature
shows that oil rich countries suffer authoritarian entrenchment and economic stagnation.
This study supports the ‘rentier state’ model which in particular emphasizes how
authoritarian regimes use patronage, handouts and deterrence in an environment of political
lethargy and economic torpor to achieve stability. Moreover, oil rich countries in this
sample have traditionally organized societies that are dependent on state subsidies and jobs.
The middle-class, where it exists, has also been dependent on the state (Nasr, 2010). If this
system – the ‘rentier state’ model – facilitates stability in Muslim-majority countries, it can
be inferred that systems that are significantly different are more prone to intrastate conflict.
Muslim-majority states started receiving oil revenue in the seventies but have been
experiencing significant spikes in intrastate conflict since the sixties (see Figure I). This
indicates that trends after WWII have been increasingly encouraging conflict in these
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countries but states with significant oil wealth are able to mitigate them. These trends may
be democratization and development. We know that the relationship between
democratization and conflict is curvilinear. Countries with moderate levels of
democratization are more prone to conflict than countries with low and high levels of
democratization (Hegre et al, 2001; Fearson and Laitin, 2003; Sørli, Gleditsch and Strand,
2005). Democratization tends to vitalize and entrench ethnic, sectarian and ideological
identities. In the absence of mature democratic norms and institutions to effectively
distribute power and resources, and a robust middle-class to facilitate cross-identity
cooperation and mobilization, democratization leads to increased horizontal polarization
and often violence. The number of democracies has risen significantly since WWII but no
Muslim-majority state have reached a level of democratic maturity where democratic
institutions and national identities are strong enough to eliminate intrastate political
violence.14 Most Muslim-majority states remain in the conflict-prone middle stage of
democratization. On the other hand, oil rich states have been able to neutralize
democratizing impulses by coopting potential opposition elites, distributing rent and
services, and maintaining security deterrence. Moreover, their resource based economies
have stalled economic development that could empower any groups independent of the
state. Consequently, it is possible oil rich Muslim-majority states are significantly less
likely to experience conflict because they have stalled democratization and development.
This does not answer the question of why Muslim-majority states experience more
intrastate conflict compared to other developing and democratizing countries. The data

14

Turkey is arguably the closest Muslim-majority country to a mature democracy and it continues to
grapple with authoritarianism and extreme political polarization.
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indicates that most of the rise in intrastate conflict in the Muslim world is driven by Islamist
insurgencies. This suggests that Islam – a system of values, beliefs and practices – is
particularly prone to fundamentalist mutations in response to modernity for reasons
suggested by Marty and Appleby (1995). 15 It can be argued that oil rich states in the Muslim
world manage this Islamist impulse by maintaining highly conservative socio-cultural
norms and laws over their societies. Muslim states without oil revenue – and the associated
somnolent political and economic conditions of a ‘rentier state’ – are unable to contain the
societal changes associated with modernization that often trigger violent fundamentalist
reactions aimed at ‘correcting’ state and society. Moreover, Muslim societies tend to have
higher fertility rates leading to youth bulges which is another factor explaining why so
many Muslim-majority states suffer intrastate conflict.
The implications of this study are sobering. It indicates that violence in the Muslim
world does not stem from a geological resource but from more intractable socio-cultural
and religious trends embedded in Muslim societies. In particular, this analysis shows that
Islam is a plausible but inadequately tested explanation for one of the most important
questions for scholars of political violence since the Cold War. Lastly, it suggests how
‘rentier states’ sidestep the often-ignored violent repercussions of democratization,
development and modernization in traditional and deeply conservative societies. The study
indicates that oil rich states are able to successfully mitigate intrastate conflict which

15

The authors of the influential Fundamentalisms Comprehended claim these movements are more likely
to arise out of religious traditions that have decentralized religious authority, a codified theology, not
experienced the indigenous growth of secular thought, and overlap with nationalist and/or ethnic identities
in conflict contexts. Moreover, if ‘essentialist’ claims about Islam are accepted, this provides a compelling
if untested explanation for the rise of Islamist-driven conflict in the Muslim world over the previous few
decades.
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provides insight into the factors that are causing conflict in the Muslim world, but these
factors and their causal mechanisms deserve analysis that is far more rigorous than this
study provides. I hope they will be avenues for further research.
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